Feeding the Crocodile and Other Lessons from the War in Bosnia

"Between April 1992 and October 1995, a country in Europe was destroyed. Tens of thousands of its inhabitants were murdered. More than a million were expelled, deported, or forced to flee in fear for their lives," reads the opening sentence of the 2001 book The Worst of Times by Brendan Simms, a Dublin-born professor of the history of international relations at the University of Cambridge.

If it weren’t for the dates mentioned, many would likely think this quote refers to Ukraine. And not without reason.

Historical parallels are always risky. They are never perfect, often misplaced, and not infrequently abused. But that doesn’t mean we can ignore them. The moment we stop critically comparing the present with the past, we stop learning from history — and expose ourselves to the risk of repeating its mistakes, even the most dangerous and bloody ones.

Of course, Russia is not Serbia, nor are the Bosnian Serbs, through whom Belgrade waged its aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the same. Russia is a nuclear superpower. This fact justifies a degree of caution regarding direct involvement in the conflict in Ukraine. I agree that it’s wise to think twice before getting into a fistfight with a rabid bear holding a nuclear bomb in its paws.

But the solution cannot be to pretend the bear is just a sulking teddy that needs comforting. Ukraine itself doesn’t realistically expect foreign military intervention. What it needs is firm international support in defending itself against a foreign aggressor — and military aid and equipment so it can defend itself.

That’s why, in deciding how we respond to this crisis, we must not forget the lessons of the war in Bosnia.

Let’s look at how Brendan Simms summarized the thinking of some of the highest and most influential British figures regarding the Bosnian conflict three decades ago:

The West Is to Blame

"The decision (by the European Community, at Germany’s initiative) to recognize Slovenia and Croatia collapsed the concept of a peace conference — there was no longer any leverage over the parties involved." Lord Carrington, former British foreign minister, NATO secretary general, and EC negotiator during the Bosnian war

"If the parties seek to adjust borders, prior recognition may hinder them." Douglas Hogg, UK Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

De-Revoltization

"The Yugoslav army has a constitutional role in maintaining public order in cases of mass civil unrest." Mark Lennox-Boyd, senior official at the British Foreign Office

The Serbs Are the Good Guys

"One of the biggest obstacles was the demonization of the Serbs. Izetbegović himself committed some crimes to drag the Americans into the war. He was a terrible little man." Lord Carrington

No Security Architecture Without Serbia

"The British were somewhat pro-Serbian due to historical ties and remained so out of pragmatism. Serbia was clearly the biggest and most important, so it had to be kept onside — there was no agreement possible without it." Lord Carrington

Everyone’s the Same

"It is unwise to assign blame to only one side where all parties have committed horrific crimes." Jeremy Hanley, UK Minister of State for the Armed Forces

"This isn’t a simple fight between good guys and bad guys. It’s a conflict of such inhumanity that the civilized world cannot comprehend it — and it cannot be blamed solely on the Serbs." Sir Nicholas Bonsor, Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs

"It’s impossible to say which side is responsible for the shelling of Sarajevo." Baroness Chalker, UK Minister for Overseas Development

"They’re all equally awful and equally bad — but there are more Serbs than the others." Lord Carrington

Military Aid Only Harms the Weaker

"Such a move would not help those it’s intended for — the Bosnian Muslims. On the contrary, lifting the arms embargo would tempt the Serbs and Croats to redouble their efforts and ensure that by the time more weapons arrived, the government forces would already be neutralized." David Hannay, UK Ambassador to the UN

"Allowing more weapons into the region would only lead to many more deaths — civilians and soldiers, Muslims, Croats, and Serbs alike." Ivor Roberts, UK Ambassador to Belgrade

Peace Has a Price

"The Muslims would do well to accept the partition of the country as proposed by international negotiators and stop trying to change the outcome on the battlefield." Patrick Bishop, journalist for the Sunday Telegraph, summarizing views from the Foreign Office

"There will be no peace in Bosnia until the land is divided." Lord Carrington

While the circumstances of the two Bosnian war and the aggression against Ukraine are not identical, the similarity between the logic and arguments used by the British government in the early 1990s and those used today by advocates of peace at any cost — even at the expense of territorial integrity, the right to self-defence (UN Charter Article 51), and the survival of the Ukrainian state — is striking.

Recently, the newspaper Delo characterized the division of opinion in Slovenia over how to resolve the Ukrainian crisis as a dispute between "pacifists" and "Russophobes." I believe that’s overly loose in the first case and extremely unfair in the second.

Supporting Ukraine is not the same as hating Russians.

Even less acceptable is labelling opposition to Putin’s nationalist imperialism and domestic authoritarianism as "Russophobia."

In fact, if the aggressor wins, it will take Russians themselves a very long time to free themselves from Putin’s yoke — not to mention what that would mean for global security.

I don’t believe that most of those labelled as pacifists by Delo have bad intentions or the cynicism and imperial arrogance that oozed from the rhetoric of British politicians and diplomats three decades ago. I believe they sincerely desire peace. It is right that we talk about this. The crisis is deep and complex, and no one has 100% of the answers.

But I do believe these people should be aware that their arguments about Ukraine often echo the discourse we already heard in Europe under similar circumstances. And it was not without consequences.

The war in Bosnia lasted longer, caused more destruction, and took more lives because proper help didn’t come in time. Had it arrived sooner, the world might never have heard of Srebrenica.

And all who sincerely strive for peace should reflect on the words of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who, in his report on the Srebrenica massacre four years after the war, sharply condemned the false moral equivalence through which international mediators and others viewed the Bosnian conflict.

"For too long," Annan wrote, "there was a widespread belief that all sides bore equal responsibility for the atrocities. The arms embargo on the internationally recognized government of Bosnia and Herzegovina served only to freeze the military balance of power in the former Yugoslavia."

He described the various diplomatic efforts as “appeasement.”

I use the English term not to provoke editors or readers of Večer, but simply because I have not yet found a good Slovenian equivalent.

To better understand what the UN Secretary-General meant, let me quote Winston Churchill: "An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile — hoping it will eat him last."

This is a truth that those seeking peace in Ukraine must not ignore.

We will not achieve peace by closing our eyes to who Putin is and what he wants.

Simms’s book focuses mostly on British politics at the time and its attitude toward the war in Bosnia, but that doesn’t mean the British were the only ones who contributed to prolonging the conflict. He also mentions UN bureaucrats who bent over backward not to provoke the Serbs — the strongest force in the region.

Some UN officials even claimed that Sarajevo wasn’t technically under siege, that Serb shelling was often provoked by the Muslims, and that the Bosnian government frequently bombed or sniped its own people — allegedly to provoke Western intervention.

Recall French President François Mitterrand’s visit to Sarajevo in June 1992.

Debates over the motives behind this unannounced visit continue to this day — especially given France’s long historical sympathy for the Serbs, which influenced its Yugoslavia policy.

Today, Boris Johnson, who covered the Bosnian war as the Sunday Telegraph’s Brussels correspondent, is one of the fiercest Western supporters of Ukraine, something Ukrainians deeply appreciate.

Still, it’s not out of the question that his current passion may also be partly linked to domestic political troubles.

This also invites comparison with recent visits to Kyiv by other leaders.

The credibility of Johnson’s outrage over Putin’s human rights violations and breaches of international law must be weighed against his own behaviour toward those very values — and not just his.

Simms’s book title is a play on words that evokes "The Finest Hour" — how the British remember the start of WWII under Churchill’s leadership, when they did what they would later deny Sarajevo’s legitimate government.

Slovenia won its own finest hours — once during the partisan resistance, and again in the war for independence.

Principle and responsibility for peace and international law demand that we also recognize Ukraine’s right to defend itself — and that we help it in every way we can.