The Postponed Breakthrough of Populism

Many have called this year’s European Parliament elections historic. Whether they really were, history will show best, but they were certainly important. Most media and analysts had billed them as a critical test of the strength of the nationalist far right and even as an opportunity for a dramatic reshuffling of the cards between pro-European and populist forces in Europe. But if we were expecting tectonic shifts, today we may be disappointed. Rather than a turning point in history, yesterday’s elections resemble another round in a boxing match in which the populist challenger managed to land a punch or two more but in the end still got a bloody nose and lost heavily. On points, admittedly, but still.

The picture of the new European Parliament is, of course, merely the aggregate reflection of twenty-eight very different national results. But here too, it is striking that there were no significant breakthroughs by the far right and populists, except perhaps in the very specific environment of Brexit-obsessed Great Britain and in the Flemish part of Belgium. In most other cases, the result more or less reflected the current balance of power at national level, as in Italy, Hungary and Poland, and in quite a few countries the populist right even won fewer votes than in national elections. This happened in Spain, and also in Germany, Estonia, Austria, Denmark, Finland and elsewhere. This is particularly interesting because in the past it was precisely European elections, in which many voters still vote with their middle finger, that allowed anti-establishment rabble-rousers to do better than in their national results. This time it was the other way round. When you are in power, or close to it, the anti-elitist card is simply not as effective as it is in the comfort of grumbling far from power.

France produced an interesting result. Once again, many described the fact that the National Front, with a new name and a new frontman, beat President Macron’s list by a good percentage point as a breakthrough for the far right. Although comparisons with the results five years ago are complicated, since the political landscape in France has changed substantially, the fact remains that the National Front under its new name won less than in the previous elections, when it was already the strongest French party, and with two more seats than it will have from now on. Interestingly, Marine Le Pen did not manage to increase her result even at the expense of the Republicans, once the dominant force in French politics, whom a sharp turn to the right and flirting with populism by Sarkozy’s successor Laurent Wauquiez pushed below ten percent and into fourth place, behind the Greens. Macron did fail in his aim of beating the far right, but he kept his support close to his first-round score in the presidential election, which, after three years of not always the most skillful leadership of the country, is a relatively solid result, especially in light of the months-long yellow vest protests, which objectively benefited the far right more.

So the picture across Europe is rather mixed. There is too much populism, but after the elections there is not significantly more of it than before. We need critical analysis, not hysteria. But since the momentum of cataclysmic sensationalism is hard to stop overnight, the first reactions in the media are still quite bombastic. Reading the first headlines, one would get the impression that all the seats lost by the EPP and S&D in the new EP were picked up by nationalists and populists. That is, of course, far from true. When the good results of the liberals and the Greens are added in, the change in the balance between the pro-European groups and the “others” shrinks considerably.

Media reporting on populism has traditionally favored adrenaline over analysis. In this way, the strength and influence of the loudest and most aggressive are artificially inflated, which of course boosts their ratings. Such a competition in sensationalist emphasis on the negative can in the end lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. That did not happen this time, despite some truly incredible headlines. Even the British Guardian wrote that the biggest winners of the elections were “radical alternatives such as the Greens and the far right.” Good Lord.

It is true that nationalists, populists, Euroskeptics and the like will have a few more seats in the new parliament, but that is far from meaning that their influence will automatically be significantly greater. First because of the numbers, which even in the new, higher total are simply too low for anything other than ineffective obstruction, and second because they are an extremely heterogeneous group, united only by antipathy to the EU and the institutions of liberal democracy, while on other important issues they will find it hard to find a common language. Salvini may run into a series of problems in his wish for an influential populist bloc. Nationalism is not the best platform for international cooperation.

There have also been changes in the balance between clearly pro-European political formations. The duopoly of the People’s Party and the Socialists lost quite a few seats, but mainly to the even more pro-European liberals and to the Greens, who, whatever the Guardian says, are not known for anti-European radicalism. Reshuffled cards among the pro-European groups are not necessarily bad news for the EU. Quite the opposite: the fact that a majority will now require a coalition of at least three pro-European parties can also have positive consequences, not least by helping to reduce the democratic deficit in the functioning of its institutions.

This year’s election results did not tip the European political scales the other way. The weight is still firmly on the side of those who support European integration and its values. The nationalist, populist far right certainly got less than it wanted and less than many predicted. But that is far from meaning that pro-European politics can breathe a sigh of relief and carry on for another five years as it has until now. If it wants to reverse current trends, it has every opportunity to do so. It faces a loud and rowdy minority that depends on, and lives off, the opportunities created for it by the inconsistency and opportunism of those who otherwise never stop talking about Europe and democracy. The recipe for victory is, at least on paper, quite simple. European politics needs more backbone and consistency in respecting its own principles, more transparency, democracy and integrity in the functioning of its institutions, more social justice, more solidarity—between peoples and between people. We need politics that inspires and enthuses people, as opposed to populism, which manipulates them. But if we do not draw the right conclusions from these elections, the next round in five years may well end quite differently. On points, if not with a knockout of democratic Europe.