Nutella Democracies

There’s no single answer to the question of why so many people, after enduring decades of authoritarianism and ideological conformity, so quickly became disillusioned with the democracy they once longed for. Eastern Europe’s disappointment with pluralist democracy is certainly part of a broader story—the global resurgence of populism driven by unbridled neoliberal globalization, which gave us Brexit, Trump, and others like them. But Eastern Europe has its own story, with its own reasons for the renewed flirtation with authoritarianism and strong leaders—reasons that are related, but not identical, to those that put a Slovenian son-in-law in the White House or convinced the British to free themselves from the Brussels yoke of European integration, solidarity, and cooperation.

While globalization without social safeguards led to stagnating or declining living standards for the middle and lower-middle classes in most developed Western economies, people in the East—at least on average—do have more than they did before political transitions. That’s a broad generalization, of course. It doesn’t take into account the loss of even minimal social security or the stark income disparities, which can’t always be convincingly explained by differences in talent, work ethic, or intelligence. Still, the differences are clear. On average, we earn more and have more. This was especially evident in Poland, which almost completely avoided the effects of the global financial crisis and maintained steady economic growth, yet it still didn’t escape the temptation of illiberal populism.

Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev recently explained this paradox with Nutella. He argued that the growing rejection of pluralist democracy can, at least partly, be explained by psychology. Political change in Eastern Europe came after years of yearning to live like those on the other side of the ideological divide. The reason for the quick reversal after the fall of the Iron Curtain, he suggests, is that the desire to imitate someone else is inherently negative—it puts the imitator in a second-class position, breeds frustration, and undermines self-respect. The outrage in Poland over Nutella allegedly being of lower quality than in Italy or France illustrates this sensitivity and the feeling that, despite all the political changes built on liberal democratic values—or, as authoritarian populists subtly suggest, because of them—Eastern Europeans are still second-rate Europeans.

Add to that the fact that most people, despite a higher standard of living, still don’t live as well as they hoped or expected. This brings us to another oft-cited reason: relative deprivation—the frustration of people whose lives have improved, but not nearly as much as those whose success doesn't seem deserved by merit or effort.

Eastern populists have found their path to power eased by the fact that those who preached democratic values during the political transition often failed to practice them. Instead of functioning democracies, many Eastern European countries ended up with half-baked systems lacking proper safeguards and checks. The rapid accession to the EU was interpreted as a stamp of democratic excellence, which in turn stalled reforms at a critical moment—when democratic immune systems were still under construction.

This idea of incomplete democracies is confirmed by the latest Global State of Democracy report from the international organization IDEA, which concludes that while there are more democracies in the world than ever before, their quality is deteriorating. The problem is that sloppy democracy is dysfunctional—it enables abuse and undermines public trust in institutions. This became especially clear during the financial crisis, which further weakened trust in both political and financial establishments, opening the door to populist, authoritarian, and nationalist alternatives. People, justifiably angry at elites who offered them a corrupted version of democracy riddled with self-interest, turned their frustration not just on the “democrats” but on democracy itself.

Disillusionment with democracy always takes on local flavors. In Slovenia, it often surfaces as resistance to so-called ideological polarization and an embrace of “project-based” politics in the national interest. But this term, ideological polarization, is slippery. It's never quite clear what we’re talking about. If it means polarization between democracy (based on human rights, political freedoms, and pluralism) on one side, and illiberal nationalism on the other, then overcoming it would run counter to the principles of the organization I work for.

If it refers to ending the division between partisans and collaborators (a reference to WWII history in Slovenia), we have to ask whether that’s about respectfully bringing closure to our painful past—or a veiled attempt at historical revisionism aimed at reshaping the future. If it means abandoning divisions between left, center, and right, then we are rejecting the essence of democratic political pluralism, which is built on the democratic contest of diverse ideas, programs, and opinions. We’ve already lived through ideological conformity in the past.

Slovenia is now getting a new government. I don’t deny the legitimacy or democratic nature of some political parties forming a new coalition based on the mandates they received in the last elections. Whether some of them have disappointed their voter base is fair game for commentary, criticism, and even protest—but it doesn’t strip them of the right to make decisions. That said, we shouldn’t pretend those decisions are apolitical or ideologically neutral. In a democracy, coalitions are always built on political interests. No single party represents the entire population or all interest groups.

As long as there is transparency, accountability, legal and political oversight—including by the media and civil society—and, crucially, regular elections where voters can render judgment, this is not undemocratic. Quite the opposite. We should be more concerned when particular interests are cloaked in nationalistic rhetoric.

Our problem isn’t political division—it’s a lack of political culture. In a democracy, “not left, not right, not center, but forward” means consistent respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights, freedom of expression, media independence, judicial autonomy, and the rejection of authoritarian nationalism. The Slovenian constitution also states that we are a social state. These are binding commitments. Any attempt to justify deviations from these constitutional and European principles in the name of progress or unity is unacceptable.

Pluralist democracy requires a left, center, and right. That doesn’t rule out cooperation—but every combination remains a political one. How the baggage of each side is handled depends on whether it stays in the trunk or becomes shared political responsibility.

Look at our neighbors. Austria’s new black-green coalition (conservatives and Greens) is not just a “project”—it’s political and ideological. The People’s Party accepted political responsibility for the green part of the platform, and vice versa. What comes of it will be judged at the next election. In a democracy, we can’t expect only ideologically similar parties to rule. But we have the right to demand that whoever governs—regardless of political color—respects democratic rules.